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ing approach. The proposed protocol, called Noent, is
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readers. The protocol provides moderate privacy pro-
tection (data and location) to single tags but its effec-
tiveness increases hugely when it is used to protect a
large population of tags (e.g. protection against inven-
tory disclosure). Moreover, in comparison with classical
approaches, Noent does not require an on-line database,
which facilitates key updating and mitigates desynchro-
nization attacks.
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1 Introduction
The market penetration of RFID technology is mainly
being delayed because its cost in comparison with other
cheaper and widely used identification technologies such
as barcodes and as a result of its associated security
risk [23, 41, 52]. One of the main drawbacks of many
RFID applications is that tags answer indiscriminately
to reader queries, compromising the privacy of tag’s
holder. To understand this better, let us consider a sim-
ple example. Suppose that Bob tags every belonging of
his house and a system raises an alarm whether the
absence of one of these is detected. Basically, Bob has
a real-time inventory of the content of his house, what
can be very useful. Nevertheless, such a system has neg-
ative implications too. A burglar can scan the content
of Bob’s house and steal depending on Bob’s inven-
tory. Similarly, RFID technology is being used for in-
ventory control, stock security and quality management
by manufactures in the food industry, textile industry,
etc. In these cases, an adversary can disclose the state of
the manufacturer’s stock which represents a private and
commercially valuable information. As shown in these
two illustrative examples, the disclosure of the content
of a large population of tags represents a serious threat
that puts private information at risk and slows down
the deployment of RFID systems.
The need to guarantee the authenticity of the par-
ties involved in an RFID identification process and the
critical nature of the information that is at stake are en-
couraging the use of standard cryptography despite the
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severe hardware limitations of low-cost RFID tags [1].
Yet the level of security strength of a certain protocol
does not depend exclusively on the cryptographic prim-
itives used, but sometimes on whether an adversary can
successfully (in time and from a given distance) break
the system. For instance, in the RFID context if an
adversary can run a brute force attack to disclose the
static identifier for a population of tags but she con-
sumes an excessive amount of time, the attack becomes
impractical. Moreover, the reader should note that the
key length used in many RFID applications is shorter
than what we can find in standard cryptographic ap-
plications [29].
1.1 Contribution
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, an iden-
tification protocol based on a cryptographic proof–of-
work is introduced. Secondly, we twist the above pro-
tocol combining it with a distance bounding protocol.
Nevertheless, we do not use the classical approach –
used in all RFID distance bounding protocols to the
best of our knowledge – in which the reader infers an
upper bound of the distance to the tag. On the con-
trary, in our scheme, the tag deduces the distance to
the reader. We emphasize here that it is the first time
that this innovative technique is proposed.
1.1.1 Cryptographic Puzzles
We introduce the use of cryptographic proof–of–work
protocols [26] to discourage misbehavior in RFID sys-
tems (i.e. the indiscriminate disclosure of the tags’ mem-
ory content). In a basic (completely insecure) identifica-
tion scheme, first the reader sends a {Request} message
to the tag and then the tag backscatters its static iden-
tifier {ID} to the reader. As an alternative, we present
a method based on a simple concept, as follows:
Reader → Tag : Request
Tag → Reader : Puzzle(ID) (1)
The idea is that RFID readers which do not devote
the required time and computational effort to solve the
puzzle will not access any relevant identification mate-
rial. Tags will generate puzzles that readers must solve
in order to identify tags. After performing this opera-
tion readers will have access to the information, previ-
ously encrypted and anonymized, i.e. the tag identifier.
However, in this straightforward solution, rogue readers
and honest readers would need to make the same effort
to solve the cryptographic puzzle.
1.1.2 Distance Bounding Protocols
As a main assumption, we theorize that legitimate read-
ers are in close proximity and dishonest readers are of-
ten distant. There are many scenarios in which this as-
sumption defend. Nevertheless, in those others in which
a rogue reader is as close as it wants to the tags, we do
not recommend the usage of our proposal. If we pick
up the example of Bob’s house again, a honest reader
– Bob inside the house and equipped with an RFID
reader – is very close to the tags (his belongings) but
a dishonest reader – a burglar at the door of the house
and equipped with and RFID reader – is far away from
the tags attached to Bob’s stock.
To the best of our knowledge, every RFID distance
bounding protocols reported in scientific literature, the
verifier (reader) infers an upper bound of the distance
the prover (tag) is away from it. We propose a role
reversal for the reader and tag, which offers a com-
pletely new perspective. In this new scenario, the confi-
dence the tag (verifier) has is a function of its distance
to the reader (prover). If we combine the use of dis-
tance checking and cryptographic puzzles, the tag can
therefore fix the hardness of the puzzle and thus the
time/computation associated with its solution depend-
ing on distance measures.
The only remaining question is how tags can esti-
mate their distance to readers. A direct approach is to
measure the time between challenges and responses in
a rapid bit exchange. As low cost tags do not possess
an on-chip clock, a capacitor’s discharge time [77] can
be enough for a rough estimate of the round trip time
(distance). Alternatively, a clock recovery circuit based
on a phase locked loop can be used, as shown in the
prototype designed by Bo et al. [7]. Independently of
the approach followed, in our proposal a certain de-
gree of inaccuracy (ei) regarding distance (di) does not
represent a major security risk. That is, the tag can
distinguish between honest readers and rogue readers
accurately, which is our main objective, if:
d2 ± e2
d1 ± e1  1
where d1(d2) is the distance to honest(rogue) readers
and e1(e2) is the error in each distance measurement,
respectively.
In summary, we propose a secure RFID identifica-
tion scheme without the need of an online back–end
database that is based on a proof-of-work and a dis-
tance checking. The goal of the protocol is to preserve
the private information of a large number of tags pro-
viding the untraceability property as well. An adversary
may compromise the privacy of an specific tag –after a
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huge computational work– but she would fail when a
large population of tags is her target. In fact, the pro-
posed scheme is a simple, yet effective, countermeasure
against massive inventory disclosure. Moreover, it can
be a useful deterrent against counterfeiting, which cur-
rently is one of the main concerns for many manufac-
turers (e.g. clothing or drug). A preliminary version of
our protocol can be found in [66]. In this article, the
protocol specification is enhanced and further analyzed
in terms of the computational overheads and security
properties achieved.
1.2 Organization
The remainder of the article is organized as follows.
Section 2 outlines the main proof–of–work based ap-
proaches found in the literature. Moreover, an overview
of distance bounding protocols is presented in Section
3. In Section 4 we propose a secure RFID Identification
Protocol based on cryptographic puzzles and the appli-
cation of a distance bounding protocol that does not
need an online Back–end Database. Performance and
security analysis are presented in Section 5. Finally, in
Section 6 we draw the main conclusions.
2 On Proof–of–Work Mechanisms and
Cryptographic–Puzzle Systems
2.1 Some Definitions and Properties
The idea of demonstrating a computational cost per-
formed in a specified interval of time, i.e. the well-
known proof–of–work (POW) system [26], is still be-
ing the basis of a number of recent security protocols.
Basically, two entities are involved in such a process,
most in the way of a challenge–response protocol, in
which usually one party (the verifier) asks the other
(the prover) to complete a simple test before granting
access or a certain service. Provers cannot obtain the re-
quested material without expending a minimal amount
of computational resource, and showing the expected
evidence. We illustrate a basic interactive scheme, as
follows:
prover → verifier : Request
↪→: Generates or chooses a puzzle.
verifier → prover : Puzzle
↪→: Commits resources into solving it.
prover → verifier : Response
↪→: Checks Response.
In the non-interactive POW approach, a number of
puzzles are first computed in bulk and then centrally
stored together. Provers will select their own challenges
or, in other cases, a random start value, as we explain
below. This fact means that there is only one round of
communication from the prover.
On the other hand, perhaps the most interesting
property of recent POW–based approaches is the puz-
zle’s difficulty, i.e. the complexity of the computational
cryptographic operation. Several proposals address the
challenge of establishing such a cost dynamically and
according to different parameters such as the quality of
service demonstrated in past interactions.
2.1.1 Trapdoors
Regarding the definition of the computational cost of
solving a puzzle, a new concept appears in the mid–
1970s, namely, the trapdoor [73]. We say F is a trap-
door function if there exists some secret information
k, such that given F (x) and k it is easy to compute x
and otherwise not. A value is committed that cannot be
discovered until the committer reveals either the value
(or some other secret) or performs a private computa-
tion. Various types of commitment functions have been
proposed that maintain a secret for a predictable time
delay or until a moderate and predictable amount of
computation has occurred.
A bit commitment is a means of requiring an en-
tity to commit to a value, while keeping it hidden until
revealing its value at a later point. We use the same ex-
ample described in [73] to introduce this concept. Alice
generates two random-bit strings {R1, R2} and com-
mits to a message M by computing h(R1||R2||M) and
sending {R1, h(R1||R2||M)} to Bob. When she wants
to reveal M to Bob, she sends {R2||M}. By the prop-
erties of the hash functions: 1) Bob cannot determine
M from the first message Alice sent; 2) Alice cannot
find a different pair {R′2,M ′} such that h(R1||R2||M) =
h(R1||R2||M ′). Weakly Secret Bit commitment (WSBC)
functions work on the same principle, but with the no-
ticeable difference that the secrecy of the bit commit-
ment is breakable after an acceptable predefined limit
in terms of time and/or computation. 2nd preimage re-
sistance and weak-preimage resistance are the general
properties that a WSBC function ω() should have. Ad-
ditionally, collision resistance and near-preimage resis-
tance [47] may be required, depending on the specific
application. Interested readers can find an excellent sur-
vey on bit commitments in [33].
In adition, we can find several similarities between
the common “rational exchange” requirements and the
way of fairly delivering trapdoors, indeed. As we fur-
ther detail, our proposal encounters that challenge in
an elegant way.
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A (the verifier):
first secretly chooses a one–way
encryption function, F , and
creates a set of Npuzzles:
ith → G(k, (N ∗ F (K, i) + i)), ∀i = 1, · · · , N
where K is the key used with F function,
and k is the mutually agreed key for G. Puzzles
−→
B: selects one of these puzzles
at random, say jth(j ∈ [1, · · · , N ]), and
solves G(k, (N ∗ x+ j))
Basically, B will find x simply by
trying all possibilities, then
x transmitting it in clear to A.
←−
can apply the decryption function,
F−1, to x, and determines j,
which can be used as a key by
both A and B in further communications.
Fig. 1 The Puzzles System first conceived in 1974 by Ralph Merkle [51].
2.1.2 The First Puzzle–based System
The Puzzles System was first conceived in 1974 by Ralph
Merkle [51] to ensure two–parties can communicate se-
curely over an insecure channel. The two parties will
agree on a shared secret by exchanging messages. A
Merkle’s puzzle consists of a bulk of puzzles in the form
of an encrypted message with an unknown key. Puzzles
use one–way encryption functions whereas the key must
be short enough to allow a brute force attack. Let A and
B agree on an encryption function, G, also known by
eavesdroppers. G is a common encryption function of
two arguments: 1) the message it must encrypt, and 2)
the encryption key. Figure 1 illustrates the protocol’s
messages and both parties interactions.
Contrary to the approaches described in sections be-
low, this first cryptographic puzzle found in the liter-
ature was not designed as a proof of work, but as an
early construction for a public key cryptosystem. In-
stead, early POW approaches concentrated on finding
mechanisms to throttle nodes’ selfish behavior by CPU–
bound cost–functions, which parameterize the amount
of work needed to gain some resource. Moreover, differ-
ent primitives have been applied as a defense against
spam and connection depletion, among others. We re-
view the main approaches chronologically in sections
below (see Figure 2 for a schematic summary).
2.2 Early POW Approaches
2.2.1 Limiting Access
Dwork and Naor in 1992 [26] first formalized the afore-
mentioned ideas to combat junk mailers by requiring
senders to demonstrate that they have expended pro-
cessing time in solving a moderately hard function of
the message, called pricing function. Authors suggest
three candidates for pricing functions: extracting Square
Roots, the Fiat-Shamir based scheme, and the Ong-
Schnorr-Shamir based scheme. For more details we refer
the reader to the original work. By definition, the func-
tion is expensive to solve, while staying comparatively
cheap on the verifier side. On the one hand, the global
aim is to limit the abilities (resources and time) of ad-
versaries since spammers (even using botnets) cannot
compile unlimited amounts of processing time at their
disposal. On the other hand, the pricing function should
be easy to evaluate given some sort of secret trapdoor
or shortcut. Thus, obtaining a trapdoor function relies
on the family of cryptographic functions used.
In 1996, Rivest, Shamir, and Wagner [68] thwarted
the related problem of an attacker capable of solving
puzzles in parallel by means of time–lock puzzles. A
time–lock puzzle presents a computational problem that
cannot be solved without continuously running for a
precise amount of time, i.e. encrypting some material
(e.g. an encryption key) with the result of repeatedly
squaring a value with respect to a composite module.
Therefore, these puzzles can be used to implement de-
lays, i.e. by setting the amount of computation, being
the amount of delay controlled. Time–lock puzzles use
fixed–cost functions, based on superencryption in RSA,
and trapdoors.
Furthermore, Back’s Hashcash system [5], first an-
nounced in 1997, mainly deals with email spam, and
denial of service (DoS) attacks as well, by applying
a trapdoor–free non–interactive POW system. A cost–
function based on finding partial SHA-1 hash collisions
assists in filtering email clients. Implementations (de-
veloped in several programming languages) modify the
message’s header by adding a hashcash token, which
consists of several recipient–related data such as an
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Fig. 2 A chronological classification of the main POW functions according to their objectives and to the cryptographic
primitives used.
address, a timestamp and a random nonce. The main
difference between the hashcash cost–function and the
pricing function mentioned before is that the former is
trapdoor-free in order to avoid that senders can cheaply
mint tokens to others. However, senders will also have
to expend a required processing time to produce a valid
header.
2.2.2 Metering Access
POWs have also been suggested for metering access.
Franklin and Malkhi proposed a secure web metering
system, first published in 1997 [30] and later patented
in 2000, to monitor Web–site accesses by involving users
in computing the timing function for a given input.
The timing function is based on one-way hash functions
and a unique seed generated for each visit. Later, and
due to the importance of web advertising, in 1998 Naor
and Pinkas [58] presented an efficient metering system
that relies on the polynomial secret sharing scheme of
Shamir. Essentially, an audit agency generates a chal-
lenge, i.e. a large computational task, and sends it to
the server through a secure channel. Each client will be
asked to perform a small part of this task, whose final
completion proves the visit of k clients using their re-
sponses during the time frame. Note that an additional
intermediate role, i.e. the auditory entity, modifies the
interactive challenge–response protocol and therefore
special attention should be paid to communication effi-
ciency and clients collaboration.
2.2.3 Combating DoS
There have been several works that use cryptographic
puzzles as an elegant solution to combat denial of ser-
vice attacks. The Client–Puzzle Protocol introduced
by Juels and Brainard in 1999 [42] uses cryptographic
client puzzles for preventing a communication protocol
such as TCP and SSL from connection depletion by
rate limiting TCP connections. Client puzzles apply a
bounded probabilistic cost function. Since the client is
expected to search some key space for a known solution,
the size of the key space imposes an upper bound on
the cost of finding the solution. Authors also use brute-
force reversal of a one–way hash function h, as follows.
To create a new puzzle, the server generates a random
nonce nS and the difficulty level k > 0 of the puzzle
(i.e. the k first bits of the hash set as null). Both infor-
mation is sent to the clients. To solve the puzzle, the
client IDC generates a random nonce nC , and solves X
(i.e. the expected solution) from the following equation
by brute force:
h(IDC , nS , nC ,X ) =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
000 . . . 000Y
where Y are the rest of the hash bits and represent any
bit pattern. The prover is expected to try 2k possible so-
lutions before finding the right one. Note that nS must
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be changed periodically in order to prevent attackers
from pre–computing solutions. To this regard, Jakob-
sson and Juels’ Bread Pudding Protocols, presented in
1999 [40], extend the client puzzle protocol to perform
an otherwise useful computation, i.e. re–used the com-
putation waste for another purpose. Their proposal has
been recently patented.
2.3 Recent Approaches
Now, the idea of using cryptographic POW to increase
the cost of sending email and make sending spam un-
profitable is being extended to other emerging research
areas. It is the turn of new resource–constrained plat-
forms like Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) and RFID
systems, and also peer-to-peer (P2P) systems. Simi-
larly, there are several publications on mitigating DoS
and free-riding attacks as well as providing solutions
for routing and authentication in such domains. To deal
with free-riding, the underlying idea is that sharing can
be encouraged by imposing a cost on the downloads, but
ensuring that those who share more freely do not incur
this cost, and this way dealing with user self–interest. In
Mankins et al.’s micropayment scheme [50], published
in 2001, users are given an incentive to work together to-
wards a common goal through the introduction of these
puzzles. Authors present and evaluate several types of
micropayment variants.
In the meantime, Abadi et al.’s contribution in 2003
[2] presents an alternative computational POW approach
based on memory latency, since memory latency varies
much less than that of CPU speeds. The authors called
this invention: Memory–Bound Functions (MBFs). Be-
fore MBFs, the more powerful participants may be able
to solve puzzles faster than others. Now, the puzzles
are processor or memory bound computations, and can
be used to ensure that every node will spend approxi-
mately the same amount of critical resource. The analy-
sis and evaluation of several MBFs presented by Dwork
et al. in 2003 [27] result in a constant performance
across different machines. As a consequence of such val-
idations, many works based on MBFs were presented
in different research areas. For example, Serjantov and
Lewis [70] consider using client puzzles to provide in-
centives in P2P systems. Controversy exists, however,
about the appropriateness of imposing such an effort to
every node in the system, no matter what node’s be-
havior is. This fact is discussed in various papers, such
as Laurie and Clayton’s publication in 2004 [48], which
account the additional burden unfair and counterpro-
ductive to honest participants.
On the other hand, Borisov’s proposal, presented
in 2006 [9], imposes a computational cost on occupy-
ing a position within the overlay in order to secure its
participation in the P2P network, thus avoiding Sybil
attacks where attackers with a large amount of com-
putational resources can get a huge range of node IDs.
Furthermore, Ning et al.’s weak authentication mech-
anism, proposed in 2008 [61], uses one–way key chains
to ensure authentication of the broadcast packets in
WSNs. Likewise, POWs is recently being adapted to
RFID systems by applying lightweight functions. For
example, in Burmester et al.’s [13] challenge–response
protocol, the RFID tag can obfuscate its identifier, but
only the back–end server can disambiguate it using a
trapdoor that only it possesses. Authors use public–key
one-way functions.
Finally, it is still a challenge to consistently estab-
lish what the difficulty of a puzzle to be sent must be.
In fact, Narasimhan et al. [59] in 2010 apply Game The-
ory to formally analyze a Client–Puzzle protocol, and
state that the difficulty of the puzzle should not be de-
termined without a minimal number of computations.
Simulations conducted were based on existing puzzles
like hash–reversal and time–lock puzzles.
A note on our proposal. Our proposal is de-
signed to control the work on the reader side, bounding
the time necessary to reveal the tags’ identifiers. The
idea is that RFID readers which do not devote the re-
quired time and computational effort to solve the puz-
zle cannot access any relevant identification material.
Tags will generate puzzles (a symmetrically encrypted
cryptogram and a trapdoor, i.e. some bits of the se-
cret key used in encryption), while readers must solve
them in order to identify tags. After this situation takes
place, readers will possess the information previously
encrypted and anonymized, i.e. the tag identifier. As
we describe below, tags establish the hardness of the
puzzle, and thus the time/computation associated with
its solution, depending on distance measures towards
the reader. Moreover, note that the experimental puz-
zles (initially proved) lie on the exhaustive search on
the key space as the fastest method to recover the se-
cret key used in the construction of the symmetric cryp-
tosystem.
3 On Distance Bounding Protocols
3.1 Preliminaries
Desmedt et al. introduced at Crypto’87 a new attack
called the mafia fraud [22] that defeats any authentica-
tion protocol. This attack allows an adversary to suc-
cessfully pass the authentication by relaying the mes-
sages between a verifier and a legitimate prover and is
based on the chess grandmaster problem [19]. In 1987,
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Fig. 3 Mafia fraud attack
the mafia fraud appeared somehow unrealistic because
the legitimate prover is required to be involved in the
execution of the protocol without being aware of the
fraud. However, the great deployment of passive RFID
systems turned this attack into a real threat [25, 37]. In
a mafia fraud scenario, both the reader R and the tag
T are honest, but a malicious adversary is performing
a man-in-the-middle attack between the reader and the
tag by using both a rogue tag T and rogue reader R.
The adversary makes T interact with the honest reader
R and makes the rogue reader R interact with the hon-
est tag T . In addition, both rogue parties act as proxies
forwarding each other all the messages they receive. As
a result, the reader R will authenticate the presence of
a rogue token (T ), that is typically further away than
T , while R and T remain unaware of the manoeuvre. A
plot of the attack scenario is shown in Figure 3. As a
practical example of this attack let us imagine that an
adversary wants to open a car fraudulently. He has to
place the rogue card near the vehicle while an accom-
plice with a rogue reader places himself near the owner.
The legitimate reader of the car powers the rogue card
and the rogue reader powers up the owners card and
the messages are forwarded. The electronic protection is
thus breached remaining both genuine parties unaware.
The reason why they remain unaware is that RFID tags
are simple devices that automatically answers to any
authentication query from a reader without alerting its
holder. As a consequence, the reader has no way to
decide whether the tag holder agreed to authenticate,
being the presence of the tag in the close environment
of the reader an implicit authentication agreement from
its holder. Due to the maximum reader-tag communi-
cation distance cannot exceed a few decimeters with
cryptography-compliant tags, providing the reader with
a means to decide whether the distance to the tag is less
than a given threshold is of utmost importance.
3.2 Distance bounding protocols and RFID systems
Distance Bounding protocols (DBP) emerged as a coun-
termeasure against mafia fraud. Desmedt et al. intro-
duced the distance bounding concept [6] based on the
measurement of the Round Trip Time (RTT) of ex-
changed messages. Then, in 1993, Brands and Chaum
Fig. 4 Terrorist fraud attack
designed the first distance bounding protocol [10] based
on Desmedt et al. ideas. It was not until 2005 that
Hancke and Kunh proposed the first distance bound-
ing protocol specifically designed for RFID devices [36].
Since then many proposals have appeared that tries to
improve these protocols.
There are three types of attacks related with the
distance between the reader and the tag. First, the dis-
tance fraud attack [10] where a dishonest tag may claim
to be closer than it really is. Second, the already ex-
posed mafia fraud attack and finally the so called ter-
rorist attack [21] that is also a relay attack but con-
siders an scenario where a dishonest tag colludes with
an adversary to trick a reader of its physical proximity.
The tag motivation could either be that it is fraudulent,
or that it is honest but being coerced by the attacker.
This attack is depicted in Figure 4. Here, the behav-
ior of tag T is not legitimate and collaborates with the
rogue tag T . T uses T to convince the reader that T is
close, when in fact it is not. It is important to note that
in a terrorist attack is assumed that T does not have
any advantage for future attacks [32]. Amongst these
three types of attacks mafia fraud is the most serious
since it can be mounted without the notice of neither
the reader nor the tag.
Relay attacks cannot be prevented by cryptographic
protocols that operate at the application layer of an
RFID protocol stack. At this layer, information about
arrival times of messages has already been blurred sub-
stantially by the many synchronization, collision avoid-
ance, demodulation, symbol-detection, error-detection
and retransmission mechanisms that are implemented
in the lower layers [36]. The defense shall be integrated
into the physical layer of the communication proto-
col, so as to obtain high-resolution timing information
about the arrival of individual data bits.
3.3 Main Approaches
There are several solutions to estimate the distance be-
tween two devices. For instance, the use of the global
positioning system (GPS), perform multi-channels com-
munication or the received signal strength indication
(RSSI) [29, 32]. However, a GPS receiver is too ex-
pensive to be added to a low-cost RFID, the physical
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layer is too simple to allow multi-channels communica-
tion and the RSSI can be amplified by the adversary.
Accordingly, the solution adopted to design distance
bounding protocols for RFID systems is to measure the
RTT in order to estimate an upper bound on the dis-
tance between the reader and the tag. This solution
only requires a single trusted clock on the reader side
and no hardware modification for the tag.
Brands and Chaum’s distance bounding protocol
[10] consists of a fast bit exchange phase where the
reader sends out one bit (i.e. a challenge) and starts
a timer. Then the tag responds to the reader with one
bit (i.e. a response) that stops the timer. The reader
uses the RTT to extract the propagation time. This
process is repeated n rounds for security reasons and
the reader decides whether the tag is within the limi-
tation of the distance. The processing time of the tag
must be as short and invariant as possible in order to
extract the propagation time accurately.
The are two main approaches for the communica-
tion method. Firstly, we can use an ordinary communi-
cation channel without any correction mechanism. The
main drawback of this approach is the unwanted er-
rors prompted by noise and multi-path effects in the
channel. Alternatively ultra wide band (UWB) chan-
nels seems an interesting approach to combat errors
in the channel and to achieve a resolution of 30 cm or
less. Unfortunately, UWB channels have not been prac-
tically implemented in the RFID environment. We urge
the interested reader to consult Section 4 in [35], where
a detailed description of the posibles communication
channels for distance-bounding is included.
The popular Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol [36] also
uses the expensive and complex UWB channel. Reid
et al. [67] try to overcome this problem and propose
a low-cost protocol that removes this extra link tak-
ing advantage of the generally undesirable side channel
effects. Later on, Munilla and Peinado [56] proposed an-
other low-cost protocol after pointing out certain prob-
lems in the estimation of the timing resolution in Reid
et. al’s work [67].
Among the existing distance bounding protocols based
on RTT, two main types can be distinguished depend-
ing on the necessity of a final signed message to end
the protocol. On the one hand those that need a signa-
ture were introduced by Brands and Chaum [10]. The
final signature can be computed on the challenges and
the responses only, or on some other information like
the nonces exchanged. On the other hand, those based
on Hancke and Kuhn protocol [36] in which there is no
need of a final signature finishing when the measure-
ment of the RTTs is done. Both protocols can be im-
plemented using symmetric-key cryptography. Brands
and Chaum’s protocol needs three phases: the first and
final ones are slow phases while the second one is fast.
The RTT is measured n times during the fast phase,
while the slow phases include all the time-consuming
operations; in particular the final slow phase is used to
complete the authentication. On the contrary, Hancke
and Kuhn’s protocol consists of a single slow phase fol-
lowed by a fast one with n RTTs measured. In this case,
the fast phase allows the verifier to check both authenti-
cation and distance. Most of existing works derive from
either Brands and Chaum’s protocol [45, 57, 54, 71] or
Hancke and Kuhn’s protocol [3, 43, 60, 67, 74]. The
proposal in [77] is from this perspective an “hybrid”
protocol.
3.3.1 Recent Variants
Distance Bounding protocols mitigates mafia fraud at-
tack but the adversary always have a certain proba-
bility of success. This is the reason why these proto-
cols are compared in terms of this probablity. Munilla
and Peinado [54] proposed a protocol in which the suc-
cess probability of an adversary to accomplish a mafia
fraud attack is reduced. However, the feasibility of the
scheme is questionable since it requires three physical
states {0, 1, void}. Singelee and Preneel [71] proposed
a distance bounding protocol which uses an error cor-
rection code to facilitate the corrections of errors (in
noisy channels) during the rapid bit exchange. Never-
theless, this scheme’s security and implementation cost
on RFID tags is questioned in [55]. Finally, the above
mentioned protocols do not address terrorist fraud at-
tacks. In 2007, Tu and Piramuthu [77] addressed both
terrorist and mafia fraud attacks and proposed an en-
hanced scheme. The authors used ideas previously pre-
sented in [67] to prevent terrorist attacks. Nevertheless,
Kim et al. [45] noted that Tu and Piramuthu’s protocol
is vulnerable to a simple active attack and proposed a
new protocol attempting to correct the defenses of all
its predecessors.
Kim et al. [45] fulfilled a comparison of the main
DBP on several points of view: mafia and terrorist fraud
attack resistance, error resistance, privacy preservation,
mutual authentication and computational overhead in-
side the tag. Regarding the security against mafia fraud
attack, the false acceptance ratio (M-FAR), i.e. the
probability that an adversary succeds, is computed.
Mitrokotsa et al. [53] proved that the M-FAR of Reid
et al. is (3/4)n and not (7/8)n as reported in [45]. Ac-
cordingly, we have changed this value in Table 1 that
reproduces the comparison provided in [45]. As can be
seen, the security against terrorist fraud attack and its
success probability for an adversary (T-FAR) are com-
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Table 1 Comparison of distance bounding protocols [45]
Mafia M-FAR Terrorist T-FAR E. R. Privacy M. A. C. O.
BC[10] Yes (1/2)n No - No - No 2
HK[36] Yes (3/4)n No - Yes - No 1
R. et al.[67] Yes (3/4)n Yes (3/4)v Yes No No 2
SP[71] Yes (1/2)n No - Yes - No 1+ECC
C. et al.[14] Yes (1/2)n No - No - Yes 4
NV[60] Yes (1/2)n No - No - No 2k
K. et al.
(MA)[45] Yes (1/2)n Yes (3/4)n Yes Yes Yes 3
K. et al.
(no MA)[45] Yes (1/2)n Yes (3/4)n Yes Yes No 2
†E. R.: Error Resistance M. A.: Mutual Authentication C. O.: Computation Overhead
pared in a similar way. The resilience against channel
errors is pretty important for protocol’s robustness, as
fast bit exchanges are typically sensitive to channel er-
rors. Reid et al.’s protocol discloses identities in cleart-
ext during protocol execution, and is thus not privacy-
preserving. Most of the other protocols assume that the
reader knows the identity and secret key of the tag be-
fore starting distance bounding protocol, hence ignoring
the privacy issue or assuming a single secret is shared
by all tags. Kim et al.’s protocol allows the reader to
learn the tag’s identity during execution, although the
corresponding overhead is pretty high due to the need
of an exhaustive search among all possible keys. Fi-
nally the amount of computation needed in the tag is
measured as the required number of computation of
pseudo-random functions such as hash functions, sym-
metric key encryptions, etc.
4 NOENT: A Secure RFID Identification
Protocol with an Off–line Back–end Database
In this Section, a new protocol based on the combined
use of cryptographic puzzles (proof-of-work) and distance-
bounding protocols (distance checking) is introduced.
Before introducing the details, the protocol objectives
are described – see Section 5.2 for a detailed analysis
of the security properties. The protocol has to offer pri-
vacy protection of the confidential information stored in
the tag. That is, the static identifier (ID). This identi-
fier allows the unequivocal identification of the tag and
can be used as a search index to allocate all the addi-
tional information linked to the tag and stored in the
off-line back-end database. The anonymization of mes-
sages is crucial to avoid traceability and replay attacks.
The protocol offers “moderate” protection concerning
privacy and traceability when a single tag is consid-
ered. We claim that the security level is “moderate”
because an adversary – located far away from the tag
and equipped with a reader – after a highly consuming
computation can disclose its secret information, putting
at risk its privacy. Nevertheless, the mechanism results
very effective when a larger population of tags is con-
sidered and in such a case the task of the adversary
becomes unaffordable. As a consequence, the protocol
results very useful to face interesting real problems such
as inventory disclosure or cloning a population of tags
(e.g. massive counterfeiting).
4.1 Notation
R and T denote the two protocol parties, reader and tag
respectively. As commonly assumed, readers and tags
use a non-secure communication channel. That is, the
forward (reader-to-tag) and backward (tag-to-reader)
channels are insecure. We also assume that the ID is the
information these two entities would like to exchange
securely, where ID symbolizes the unique identifica-
tion number of the tag. Moreover, enck(x) is a sym-
metric key algorithm (e.g. the block cipher AES [28] or
TEA [39]) that encrypts message x under key k. The
concatenation of variables is denoted by ||. Let ςj =
enck(n1||ID||αj ||n1||j) represent the cryptographic puz-
zle sent by T at the j-th protocol instance, where n1 is
a random number and αj represents the challenge bits
in the low-level distance-bounding exchange. The com-
bined use of this nonce and the encryption algorithm
facilitates tag identification, providing anonymity and
privacy protection, as shown in Section 5.
Likewise, ωpij (k) represents a WSBC function, i.e. a
trapdoor (refer to Section 2 for further information).
Specifically, the WSBC we suggest for the ID is simply
〈ςj , ωpij (k)〉. Solutions such as time-lock puzzles, which
encrypt k with the result of repeatedly squaring a value
with respect to a composite module may be a very nat-
ural implementation for ω(). However, we are forced
to choose a much simpler solution due to the severe
restrictions of low/moderate-cost tags, which are the
most suitable for these kind of solutions [64]. Specifi-
cally, in our proposal, the tag randomly selects l bits
of k, and this collection of bits forms ωpij (k). However,
for high-cost tags that possess superior computational
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capabilities, we find more convenient the use of strong
solutions such as those outlined previously.
Finally, h(a||b) is a hash function whose input is the
concatenation of a and b. Specifically, υj = h(j||n1||ID||
αj ||n2) is the pseudonym sent by the tag at the j-th
identification process which mainly has the role of al-
lowing the verification of the puzzle solution after the
reader completes the operation. Generally, a pseudonym
transmits the static identifier of a tag with the guaran-
tee of keeping confidential information secret and en-
suring the untraceability of tag responses [75].
4.2 Noent Protocol
In this Section the Noent protocol is presented. First, an
initialization phase is introduced and then the protocol
is described.
4.2.1 Initial Preparations
Each tag has an unique identifier number (ID) and a
secret key (k), that are set in the initialization process.
The ID and some additional information linked to the
tag is stored in an off-line back-end database. Legiti-
mate readers have access to the information stored in
this database after a successful authentication.
4.2.2 Identification Protocol
In this Section a secure identification protocol between
a tag an a reader is introduced. We note here that the
back-end database is not involved in this process. So,
the reader may run the protocol several times to iden-
tify a population of tags. Then, once the static identi-
fiers of these tags are disclosed, the reader may establish
a secure connection (i.e. SSL) and check all these val-
ues in a single step, avoiding a permanent connection
to the back-end database. This approach is not com-
pletely new; similar solutions appear in [34, 46].
The steps of the protocol for a tag identification are
described below (see Figure 5).
Weak Secret Bit Commitment + Authenti-
cation (Steps 1-3-4)
1. R → T : m1 = request, n1, γj
R generates two nonces {n1, n2}, a t-bit sj random
value and commits this value by sending random
number n1 and message γj (γj = h(n1||n2||sj)).
Distance Bounding Protocol (Step 2)
Reader Tag
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1. R→ T : m1 = request, n1, γj
2. Distance-bounding protocol
2.0 For i = 1, ...t
T → R: αj(i)
R→ T : βj(i) = αj(i)⊕ sj(i)
2.1 R→ T : n2, sj
3. T → R: m2 = n3, 〈ςj , ωpij (k)〉, υj , νj
4. R→ T : m3 = n5, τj
where {ni}5i=0 are different nonces
γj = h(n1||n2||sj)
ςj = enck(n1||ID||αj ||n1||j)
ωpij (k) = {kpi(0), kpi(1), . . . , kpi(l−1)} is a l-bit
WSBC function, pi() is a given permutation
and l = f(drt)
υj = h(j||n1||ID||αj ||n3)
νj = enck(j||n4||ID||n1)
and τj = enck(j||n5||ID + 1||αj ||βj ||n4||n1)
Fig. 5 WSBC + Distance-Bounding Authentication Scheme
(Noent approach)
2. T and R start a low-level distance-bounding ex-
change. Due to the practical infeasibility of using
UWB channels, we opt for using the normal commu-
nication channel without any corrections techniques
or packet delimiters – to minimize latency. αj and
sj symbolize a t-bit random value generated by the
tag and the reader, respectively. The bit at the i-th
position is denoted by subindex (i).
– The following steps are repeated t times, for i =
{1, . . . , t}:
– T sends bit αj(i) to R.
– R sends bit βj(i) = αj(i) ⊕ sj(i) to T im-
mediately after the reception of αj(i).
– After completion of the rapid bit exchange, R
opens the commitment of the hidden value sj by
sending {n2, sj}.
– T can determine an upper bound on the {drt}
distance to R using the maximum of the delay
times (RTT) between sending out bit {αj(i)}
and receiving bit {βj(i)} back. As we have t
rounds of exchanging bits without correcting tech-
niques and due to the presence of noise in the
channel – real communication channel –, an ac-
ceptable threshold for the number errors have to
be set. This problem was sketchily introduced in
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[44] and recently a formal framework was pro-
posed in [24].
3. T → R: m2 = n3, 〈ςj , ωpij (k)〉, υj , νj
The tag generates two new nonces {n3, n4} and com-
putes a WSBC 〈ςj , ωpij (k)〉 which depends on the
distance (drt) that separates the tag and the reader.
Specifically, the l variable of ωpij (k) is conditioned by
the distance {l = f(drt)}. Note that the tag sends
its static identifier (ID) in an anonymized and pri-
vacy protection way by enclosing this value in the
cryptographic puzzle. Finally, message m2 is ended
by an authentication message νj = enck(j||n4||ID||n1)).
4. R → T : m3 = n5, τj
R sends to T the nonce n5 and the encrypted mes-
sage τj (τj = enck(j||n5||ID + 1||αj ||βj ||n4||n1))
which has a double purpose: 1) the tag can authen-
ticate the reader; 2) the tag is able to check that the
messages (challenges and responses) in the rapid bit
exchange have not been altered by an adversary.
5 Analysis
In this section we first evaluate the use of cryptographic
puzzles. Then, the security properties of Noent scheme
are scrutinized.
5.1 Performance Analysis
In this subsection, we estimate the computational ef-
fort required by readers to solve the cryptographic puz-
zle enclosed in the WSBCs. As RFID readers are much
more powerful than tags in terms of computation and
storage capability, we focus on the time consumed in
each identification. Optimization of this factor is one
of the main objectives for any identification system.
A trade-off between security (i.e. inventory protection)
and system performance is thus necessary.
For the experiments conducted, we considered two
block ciphers as the basis for cryptographic puzzles,
AES-128 and TEA [20, 69]. Both were coded in C,
compiled with Microsoft Visual C++, and run on an
AMD ATHLON(tm)2600 2.09GHz processor, with 1GB
RAM under Windows XP SP2. The reader should note
that these values are easily extrapolated to the val-
ues obtained with commercial RFID readers. Firstly,
in many scenarios RFID readers are directly connected
to computers, benefiting of all its processing capabili-
ties. Secondly, in those scenarios in which a handheld
RFID readers are used, we should realize that nowa-
days the computing and memory capabilities of these
mobile devices are very similar to PCs (e.g. Motion CV5
at 1.2GHz and 1GB RAM [17]).
Table 2 Average computational effort made (in 1000 exper-
iments) by each reader for varying amounts of known bits
Average time required
(sec)
n− l
bits
l bits AES-128 TEA
32 96 5495 761
28 100 544 47
24 104 15 0.22
20 108 0.01 0.01
A factor contributing to complexity is the cost of ex-
ecuting several decryptions, for testing each candidate
key. Specifically, the reader receives 〈ςj , ωpij (k)〉, where
ςj and ωpij (k) represent the cryptographic puzzle and the
output of the WSBC function, respectively. The reader
then starts an exhaustive search; it probes all possible
keys and benefits from the knowledge of l key bits for
each. The above process is repeated until the correct
key is found.
We have carried out 1000 experiments for different
values of (n − l)-bits, and also randomly varying the
challenges and key used. We consider that more than
32 hidden bits would be impractical. Results are shown
in Table 2, for a key length of n = 128. For each case,
as the l value increases, the number of candidate keys
obviously decreases, so the exploration time too. For
practical considerations, the requirements of the appli-
cation in which the protocol is used will determine the
choice of the l value.
Figure 6 provides a characterization of the distribu-
tion of our results using 128–key TEA encryption and
20, 24, and 28–hidden bits trapdoors. The purpose of
this figure is to show the most extreme values in the
experimental data set (maximum and minimum values,
which we can consider them as outermost situations
or potential outliers), the lower and upper quartiles,
and the median. The results are displayed as boxplots,
where the box represents the interquartile range, and
whiskers extend to the 25th and 75th percentile of the
simulations. Around the median, we have an equal num-
ber of values above and below, forming the interquartile
range upon which we can consider an associated prob-
ability of occurrence.
Finally, we review the mandatory hardware demands
for implementation of the proposed scheme. An encryp-
tion function is employed for the generation of the cryp-
tographic puzzle and the authentication tokens. For
that, we find symmetric cryptography convenient rather
than asymmetric cryptography, which may be appropri-
ate for high-cost RFID tags (e.g. e-passports [4, 62]).
To facilitate verification of the correct solution to the
puzzle, an anonymized version of the tag’s identifier
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Fig. 6 Average time required (ms) in TEA experiments for
different values of (n− l)-bits, and also randomly varying the
challenges and key used.
is used. Specifically, for pseudonym generation, we opt
for the use of a hash function, one of the most common
solutions in the literature [15, 16, 18, 49, 72, 75, 76].
The commitment scheme is also based on the use of a
hash function. Generation of random numbers is nec-
essary to avoid traceability and replay attacks. Addi-
tionally, random numbers are also used for selection
of the l bits that constitute WSBC function output.
As many different primitives can be selected for these
purposes, we suggest various options in Table 3. We
make a rough distinction between low-cost RFID tags
and moderate-cost RFID tags [64]. To clarify this dis-
tinction, we include the approximate number of Gates
Equivalents (GE) for each of these alternatives at the
bottom of the table.
5.2 Security Analysis
The two main objectives of our protocol are privacy
protection and untraceability. Regarding privacy, the
static identifier of the tag is never sent in clear on
the channel. Specifically, an encrypted version ςj =
enck(n1||ID||αj ||n1||j) of the ID, which requires the
knowledge of the secret key k for its computation is
used for puzzle generation. The puzzle is accompanied
by a pseudonym υj = h(j||n1||ID||αj ||n3) of the tag’s
ID which is used for puzzle verification without com-
promising any confidential information. Additionally,
part of the secret key ωpij (k) is delegated from T to
R. An attacker can not exploit this as the number of
bits delegated is conditioned by the distance that sep-
arate the tag and the reader. Rogue readers are often
far way from tags or its presence would be detected
easily by modern detection techniques [12] or simple
visual inspection. Furthermore, different l bits of the
key are randomly selected and employed in each itera-
tion. Specifically, upon determining l = f(drt), the tag
randomly picks up one of the WSBCs’ possible C(n, l)
combinations, where n and l are the bit lengths of the
key and the WSBC function respectively. Where the
C(n, l) value may be considered poor in terms of secu-
rity (e.g. < 232 for low-cost RFID tags and < 264 for
moderate-cost tags [64]), we recommend updating of
the key. To offer traceability protection, the freshness
of the exchanged messages is provided by the nonces
generated by the reader and the tag and used in each
sub-message generation {γj , ςj , υj , νj , τj}. An attacker
cannot distinguish between the answers from different
tags, thus guaranteeing users’ location privacy.
Confidential information and location information
are delegated to readers once a cryptographic puzzle is
solved. After that, the reader can acquire the private
information linked to the tag (i.e. {ID, k}). So, the re-
sponses of this tag can be uniquely identified using the
captured information, compromising the tag holder’s
privacy location. Does it represent a data privacy in-
vasion? Note that it is commonly assumed that rogue
readers are far way from tags and legitimate readers are
close. So, first of all there is a significant difference in
the effort made – consumed time – by an honest reader
and a dishonest reader. Secondly, the main application
of our protocol is protection against the revelation of
the contents of a great number of tags (e.g. a clothing
manufacturer’s inventory or the stock of books in a li-
brary). So a rogue reader can compromise the privacy
of a specific tag after consuming a significant amount
of time. However, this task results unfeasible – the con-
sumed time is excessive – when it deals with a group of
tags. If private information is not compromised, track-
ing this group of tags is in vain as the rogue reader
cannot distinguish between responses made by differ-
ent tags.
Regarding performance, it is questionable if the pro-
posed protocol is efficient enough. If we compare Noent
with a simple and non-secure RFID identification scheme
in which tags backscatter its static identifier indiscrim-
inately, it is not. Nevertheless, if we compare the con-
suming time of solving a puzzle – identify a tag in our
scheme – with the slow reading rate of barcode technol-
ogy, Noent is very effective, efficient and reliable. For
instance, using Noent we can check the stock of a ware-
house in few hours and this task would take several days
when barcode labels are used.
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Table 3 Practical Considerations about Implementation
Low-cost Moderate-cost
RFID tags RFID tags
Encryption
(cryptographic puzzle + authentication tokens) TEA [39] AES-128 [28]
Hash function
(pseudonym + commitment scheme) H-PRESENT-128 [8] SHA-1 [63]
PRNG
(anonymity + WSBC function) LAMED [65] Grain [38]
Total GE 4-7K GE 8-12K GE
One of the most important advantages of the pro-
posed scheme is the absence of an on-line back-end
database. The reader may connect to the database at
regular or arbitrary time-intervals and check a collec-
tion of tags identifers, all at once. Moreover, taking ad-
vantage that the tag’s secret key is neither stored in
database nor shared with the reader(s), the key of the
tag can be updated (i.e. kn = h(kn−1)) each time a tag
is read. More precisely, the reader discloses the ID and
the secret key K of the tag by solving a cryptographic
puzzle and the tag is authenticated by checking νj . The
mutual authentication is completed when the tag vali-
dates τj . There are two alternatives for the precise mo-
ment when the tag updating is executed. Basically, the
tag can update its key after sending m2 or this updating
may depend on a successful reader authentication. The
second option is appropriate when we need a perma-
nent connection to the database. Nevertheless, we opt
for the first alternative because it prevents to a greater
extent from the possibilities of a successful attack by
an adversary listening on the channel. In virtue of this
updating, the scheme provides backward security [31].
That is, past communications are protected even when
the content of the tag is revealed.
Another important aspect regarding the usage of
RFID tags is resilience to cloning attacks. The proposed
scheme can be viewed as a countermeasure against them.
An attacker can clone a particular tag after solving the
cryptographic puzzle sent by it. However, the success
ratio of this attack is zero when the number of tags
is increased because of the excessive time consumed in
solving all the associated puzzles. It may seem to read-
ers of this paper that honest readers would suffer from
the same problem. Nevertheless, our proposal is based
on the idea that the hardness of the puzzle depends
on the distance between a tag and a reader. As honest
readers are close to tags, they would receive much sim-
pler puzzles than those received by rogue readers that
are far away from tags. So, honest reader are able to
identify a voluminous population of tags. The only ex-
isting possibility is the placing of the rogue reader close
to tags but its presence would be easily detected by
using modern detection techniques such as the rogue
RFID detector proposed in [12] or classical visual in-
spection.
Regarding protection against relay attacks, the pro-
posed scheme is inspired on the most recent results in
this research area. Distance fraud attack are possible
when there is no relationship between the challenge bits
and the response bits exchanged during the distance
verification. In our scheme, the use of commitments
prevents dishonest readers from sending their answer
before reception of the challenges and response values
(i.e. βj(i) = αj(i)⊕ sj(i)) depend on the challenge bits
(i.e. αj(i)). Accordingly, the success probability for an
adversary to conduct a distance fraud attack is at most
( 12 )
t [11], where t is the number of bits exchanged in
the rapid bit phase. To avoid mafia fraud attacks, two
further precautions are taken. First, a fast bit exchange
between the tag and the reader is performed. Second,
once the distance-bounding exchange is completed, the
reader sends to the tag the encrypted message τj , which
includes all the random values {αj , βj} passed in the
fast phase by the two entities. If the encryption scheme
is secure and the reader is not in physical proximity to
the tag, an adversary has a success probability upper
bounded by the ideal ( 12 )
t [11, 44]. Finally, we empha-
size here that terrorist attacks were discarded by design
because in the protocol assumptions dishonest/terrorist
readers are considered to be far way from tags. So, the
collaboration between a dishonest reader and a terrorist
reader would result in vain.
6 Conclusions
In this paper a cutting-edge scheme, which tackles the
design of a secure RFID identification protocol, is in-
troduced. The proposal results innovative due to the
approach followed. To the best of our knowledge, it is
the first time that the use of cryptographic-puzzles and
a role reversal distance bounding protocol (tag(verifier);
reader(prover)) is proposed in the RFID context. Specif-
ically, Noent protocol povides privacy and offers protec-
tion against traceability attacks, which are two of the
main security risks linked with RFID technology. In
addition, it results a very effective protection technique
when the privacy – information and location – of a large
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population of tags is at stake. Finally, Noent does not
need an on-line back-end database what makes it very
advantageous and facilitates its use in real scenarios.
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